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Abstract This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and
situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive
abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimen-
sions that are addressed neither by the cognitive enhancement debate nor situated
cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of
cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture;
their moral status; and their relation to personal identity.
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1 Introduction
Human beings enhance their cognitive abilities in a variety of ways, but most obviously
with psychopharmaceuticals and external artifacts. The former are extensively debated
by ethicists, whereas the latter are largely neglected by ethicists. In the major hand-
books on neuroethics and cognitive enhancement (e.g., Savulescu and Bostrom 2009;
Illes and Sahakian 2011; Hildt and Franke 2013; Clausen and Levy 2015) there is little,
if any, talk of moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with external artifacts.
Examples of such “cognitive artifacts” include navigation systems, diaries, diagrams,
calculators, scale-models, timetables, textbooks, and computing devices (Heersmink
2014). Surprisingly, such artifacts and their moral aspects have not been addressed in
the cognitive enhancement debate. Situated cognition theory, in contrast, has exten-
sively studied cognitive artifacts (Norman 1993; Kirsh and Maglio 1994; Hutchins
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1995; Clark and Chalmers 1998), but also has not addressed their moral aspects in any
substantial way.1 Therefore, as a contribution to a special issue on “Critiquing technol-
ogies of the mind: Enhancement, alteration, and anthropotechnology”, the goal of this
article is to start conceptualizing moral aspects of cognitive artifacts by drawing on and
connecting the neuroethics of cognitive enhancement and situated cognition theory. It
thereby fills a gap in the philosophical literature on artifacts and opens a dialogue
between these fields.
The article begins by outlining the cognitive enhancement debate with a focus on
conceptual issues related to “cognition” and “enhancement”. Next, it briefly introduces
situated cognition theory, suggesting that human cognition is scaffolded by and some-
times integrated with technological and social structures. Having set the stage, it then
brings these debates together by presenting a number of moral issues pertaining to
cognitive artifacts, including some of their consequences for brains, cognition, and
culture; their moral status; and their relation to personal identity.
2 What is cognitive enhancement?
In the last two decades or so, a philosophical and ethical debate emerged about the
enhancement of our cognitive abilities beyond medical or therapeutic purposes. In this
debate, a number of cognitive enhancement methods and technologies are described
and then evaluated in terms of their (potential) moral, anthropological, and societal
consequences. In an overview paper, Martha Farah et al. explain that “In contrast to the
other neurotechnologies mentioned earlier, whose potential use for enhancement is still
hypothetical, pharmacological enhancement has already begun” (2004, p. 421). For this
reason, the focus in the current debate is on moral aspects of psychopharmaceuticals
(Turner and Sahakian 2006; Lynch et al. 2011). Emerging methods and technologies
for cognitive enhancement like transcranial magnetic stimulation, brain-computer in-
terfaces, brain implants, and genetic engineering, therefore, receive much less attention,
but for an overview see (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009).
2.1 Conceptual issues
Two prominent conceptual issues in the debate are definitions and characterizations of
“cognition” and “enhancement”. It is difficult to find explicit definitions of cognition in
the literature on enhancement. A notable exception are Nick Bostrom & Anders
Sandberg who write: “Cognition can be defined as the processes an organism uses to
organize information”. This includes acquiring information (perception), selecting
(attention), representing (understanding), and retaining (memory) information, and
using it to guide behaviour (reasoning and coordination of motor outputs) (2009, p.
312). Whilst their definition itself is rather broad (i.e., processes of organizing infor-
mation), it remains silent on human embodiment and our interactions with the wider
social-technological environment. An important aspect of human brains is that they are
embodied and embedded (Haugeland 1998); if relevant features of our embodiment or
environment are changed, then our cognitive abilities change as well. These aspects are
1 Notable exceptions are Donald Norman (1993, Ch. 10) and Andy Clark (2003, Ch. 7).
18 R. Heersmink
addressed neither by Bostrom & Sandberg nor the cognitive enhancement debate
more generally.
What cognition exactly is and how it is embodied and embedded is thus usually not
explained. Theorists in the debate often give examples of specific cognitive abilities
such as memory, attention, reasoning, and so on, to indicate what is enhanced. A clear
example of this approach is put forward by the British Medical Association. They
write: “The main aspects of cognition that we are interested in for the purpose of this
paper are: learning, memory and information retrieval; concentration and attention;
speed of processing; visuo-spatial ability; and executive functions including planning,
and the ability to carry out abstract reasoning” (2007, p. 5).
One can hardly blame theorists in the enhancement debate for not clearly defining
human cognition. In the philosophy of cognitive science, it has also proven difficult to
give a clear definition of cognition (Buckner 2015). Historically, there have been many
approaches to cognition. Behaviorism defines it as overt behaviour caused by environ-
mental stimuli, without any reference to mental or psychological states. Cognitivism
defines it as rule-based manipulations of symbols, which takes place in the brain and
are shielded of from the wider external world. Cognitivism has been the dominant
paradigm since the outset of the cognitive revolution in the 1950s, but has recently been
challenged by situated approaches, including embodied, enactive, embedded, and
extended approaches. These argue that human embodiment and the way we interact
with the social-technological environment are essential for understanding human
thought. So, “there is no standardized working definition of cognition on which
neuroethicists could draw” (Metzinger and Hildt 2011, p. 245). One might ask whether
this is a potential problem for the cognitive enhancement debate. No, it suffices, I think,
to give exemplars of abilities that are generally accepted by the cognitive science
community, including philosophers, as being cognitive. What is more important is to
have a full understanding of the transformative effects of enhancement technologies on
specific cognitive abilities such that ethicists can evaluate these effects, rather than to
have a broad definition of cognition.
How might cognition be enhanced? Because human cognition is a richly multidi-
mensional phenomenon, there are many methods, technologies, and strategies to
enhance it. Education, mental training, textbooks, healthy diets, shopping-lists, good-
quality sleep, calculators, caffeine, notebooks, mnemonics, Modafinil, maps, methods
of loci, and computing devices, in one way or another, enhance our cognitive abilities.
When cognition is enhanced, there is typically an increase in information-processing
speed or capacity. Cognitive tasks are then performed faster, with less error, or made
possible in the first place. On the basis of what does one distinguish between different
kinds of cognitive enhancements? Depending on one’s goal, there are various aspects
one might focus on: (1) the cognitive ability that is enhanced (e.g., memory, attention,
or reasoning); (2) the method or technology that enhances a cognitive ability (e.g.,
education, psychopharmaceuticals, or computers); or (3) the level at which the method
or technology influences cognitive functioning (molecular/cellular (e.g., Modafinil) or
conscious thought (e.g., education, mnemonics, or artifacts)). The later distinction is
particularly relevant for this paper. Psychopharmaceuticals and artifacts both enhance
cognition, but do so in very different ways: either by improving the molecular-
neurological basis for cognitive processing or by providing external information helpful
for completing cognitive tasks.
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An often discussed distinction is one between treatment and enhancement. A child
with ADHD taking Ritalin to improve focus and attention is seen as treatment, whereas
a student taking Ritalin before an exam for the same reasons is seen as enhancement.
Roughly, the idea is that treatment is considered as the goal of medicine and morally
desirable, whereas enhancement is outside the scope of medicine and morally undesir-
able or at least seen as suspicious. The intuition is that a healthy person whose
capabilities fall in the normal range does not need to be enhanced. Notions underlying
this distinction are those of disease, health, and normal functioning (Metzinger and
Hildt 2011). These notions are contingent on cultural and historical context and are thus
difficult to define clearly. The paradigm cases of therapy and enhancement are clear, but
the line between the two is rather fuzzy.
2.2 Moral values
Whilst the treatment/enhancement distinction is fuzzy, many moral considerations
regarding cognitive enhancements are nonetheless based on this distinction. Ethicists
have argued that various moral values are at stake when cognition is enhanced beyond
medical or therapeutic purposes. Using psychopharmaceuticals has certain risks such as
personality changes and emotional instability, which are often seen as undesirable by
the user and family and friends (Hansson 2005). Furthermore, the long-term effects on
the brain are unknown. It may turn out that Adderall, Ritalin, and Modafinil have
effects on brain and cognition that are detrimental in the long run.
If cognitive enhancements become widespread, there might be situations in which
people feel (are) pressured to enhance their cognitive abilities. Pilots, doctors, and other
professionals with a high responsibility towards other people’s safety or health might
benefit from cognitive enhancers (Santoni de Sio et al. 2014). It might make flights and
medical procedures safer and more efficient, due to a better memory and attention span.
Employers and organizations will see the advantages of someone who has better
memory, attention, or works more efficiently and will prefer someone who is cogni-
tively enhanced (Farah et al. 2004). This may infringe the autonomy of doctors and
pilots, but enhance safety of patients and passengers.
Some have argued that achieved skills have a higher worth than those which are
bought. So if cognitive abilities are bought with a pill or some other enhancement, it
would reduce their value and make them less admirable. It would also make those
newly gained abilities inauthentic (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009). Access to shortcuts to
better cognitive functioning would then become the determining factor of success and
failure. Virtues like dedication, persistence, and willingness to work hard for one’s
goals might disappear if success requires only money (Turner and Sahakian 2006). If
cognitive success is gained with buying enhancements, which are not available for
everyone, it can be seen as a form of cheating. For example, healthy students taking
Ritalin to enhance their focus during exams have an unfair benefit over those that did
not take it.
Currently, cognitive enhancers for healthy people are not paid for by medical
insurance. This means that only people who have access to enhancing technologies,
are willing to take certain risks, and can afford them, will be able to enhance their
cognition. It has been argued that this may increase the already large gap between
certain social-economic groups, which is considered as unjust and unfair (BMA 2007).
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Thus, according to some theorists in the debate, moral values like safety, freedom,
authenticity, equality, fairness, and others, may be compromised when cognition is
enhanced beyond medical purposes.
2.3 Psychopharmaceuticals versus external artifacts
Compared to psychopharmaceuticals and emerging neurotechnologies such as brain-
computer interfaces, external artifacts are more widespread, have a stronger and more
obvious enhancing effect on cognition, enhance a broader spectrum of cognitive
abilities, and have done so for a much longer period of time. For these reasons, it is
surprising that the enhancement debate has neglected cognitive artifacts. An exception
are again Bostrom & Sandberg. “Education and training, as well as the use of external
information processing devices, may be labelled as ‘conventional’ means of enhancing
cognition” (2009, p. 312). Thus they recognize that external devices enhance cognition,
but label them as conventional, which more or less implies that they are seen as morally
and culturally accepted. This may be one of the reasons why artifacts are not suffi-
ciently addressed by the cognitive enhancement debate. However, the attitude towards
external artifacts as conventional, which seems to be fairly representative for the debate,
runs the risk of narrowing the scope and ambition of the enhancement debate and
neuroethics more generally. In order to start addressing this problem, I now turn to a
view on cognition that puts external artifacts and material culture central.
3 Situated cognition and cognitive scaffolding
Situated cognition theory is a set of approaches to human cognition that underlines the
importance of our embodied interactions with the social-technological environment for
better understanding thought2 (Hutchins 1995; Clark 2003; Rowlands 2010). In an
early statement of situated cognition, Donald Norman (1993) points out that the human
mind is limited in capacity. The brain is a powerful information-processor, he says, but
there are limits to its capacity to remember, calculate, navigate, plan, and learn. To
overcome these limits, we create and use artifacts that scaffold us in performing
cognitive tasks. We use diaries to help us remember our appointments, pen and paper
to calculate, maps to navigate, diagrams to make inferences, timetables to plan, and
textbooks to learn (Sternberg and Preiss 2005). Such cognitive artifacts complement
(Sutton 2010) the information-storage and processing abilities of our embodied brains
by proving task-relevant information.
Information held in conscious thought is often fleeting and so one advantage of
externalizing thought is that it becomes fixed. Sometimes this information remains
fixed, as in a textbook, but other times it is modified during a task, for example when
making a calculation with pen and paper or writing an academic paper. So another
advantage is that this allows us to perform operations on the externalized information
that are very hard, if not impossible, to perform in the brain. Also, it is important to note
2 This view is sometimes also referred to as 4E cognition, putting emphasis on the embodied, embedded,
enactive, and extended nature of cognition. See Haugeland (1998), Kiverstein and Clark’s (2009) special issue
of Topoi, Menary’s (2010a) special issue of this journal, or Ward and Stapleton (2012).
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that offloading information is not a recent phenomenon associated with the computer
age and information society. We have offloaded information-storage functions to
external media for thousands of years (Donald 1991), at least since the invention of
written language captured in clay tablets, but probably even deeper into our evolution-
ary past. Minds and technologies have co-evolved at least since the dawn of language
and so current “technologies of human cognitive enhancement are just one more step
along this ancient human path” (Clark 2007, p. 278).
How exactly do artifacts enhance cognition? Following Norman (1991), a distinc-
tion can be made between the “personal view” and “system view” of cognitive artifacts.
It might seem that artifacts enhance cognition by allowing us to accomplish cognitive
tasks faster and with less error, but what they really do, Norman says, is transform one
cognitive task into another. When pilots use a checklist rather than their biological
memory, they make less mistakes. According to the system view, pilot-plus-checklist is
an enhanced memory system because it is more reliable. However, according to the
personal view, which is the subjective point of view of the artifact-user, the task is
transformed from retrieving items from biological memory into retrieving items from
the list. On this view, the list is not an enhancer because it does not improve biological
memory, but merely transforms a task. Only when we take a systems perspective, can
we speak of enhanced cognitive abilities.
Moreover, we do not just use artifacts to help us think, we also quite often rely on
other people to complete our cognitive tasks. Psychologist Daniel Wegner (1995)
describes how dyads and social groups develop transactive memory systems, which
can be defined as a cognitive system shared by people in close relationships developed
for encoding, storing, and retrieving information (see also Sutton et al. 2010). Celia
Harris et al. (2010) describe an illustrative example of how transactive memory works.
In their real-world example, a long married couple tries to recall the name of the show
they saw on their honeymoon more than 40 years ago. Neither of them knows the name
of the show, but by giving each other cues, they jointly construct the answer.
F: And we went to two shows, can you remember what they were called?
M: We did. One was a musical, or were they both? I don’t … no … one …
F: John Hanson was in it.
M: Desert Song.
F: Desert Song, that’s it, I couldn’t remember what it was called, but yes, I knew
John Hanson was in it.
M: Yes
The above examples show that humans are creatures whose embodied brains are
situated in a technological and social ecology of cognitive scaffolding. Such scaffolding
enhances human cognition by providing information that is relevant for performing a
cognitive task or by allowing us to manipulate and process the external information in a
way that is difficult to do in our brain. Thus without artifacts and other people we
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would not have the same cognitive abilities. In some cases, agent and scaffolding are
coupled in such a way that they can best be seen as a single cognitive system. When
that happens, the cognitive system is extended or distributed (Hutchins 1995; Clark and
Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010b; Rowlands 2010; Sutton et al. 2010). This occurs with
both social and artifactual scaffolding, but given the goal of this paper I will focus
on the latter.
To illustrate the notion of extended and distributed cognitive systems, consider Otto
and his notebook (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Otto has Alzheimer’s disease and thus
battles with a decline in his ability to encode, store, and retrieve information. To
compensate for his poor memory, he uses a notebook in which he writes important
information such as names, addresses, phone numbers, things to do, observations,
ideas, etc. The notebook is an essential tool for Otto. He deeply relies on it and always
carries it with him so that the information is there when he needs it. Due to his poor
memory, the notebook has become a substitute for his biological memory, playing the
same causal roles as information stored in his biological memory. Clark & Chalmers
argue that what is central for external information to be constitutive of a cognitive
state or process is a high degree of trust, reliance, and accessibility, and we must
have endorsed it at some point in the past. These conditions are often referred to
as “trust and glue”.3
Further developing the notion of a systems perspective, one may ask when people
and artifacts are integrated into a unified cognitive system. This, I suggest, is a matter of
degree and is best seen as a multidimensional phenomenon in which integration varies
along a number of dimensions (Heersmink 2015). These dimensions include the kind
and intensity of information flow between agent and scaffold, the accessibility of the
scaffold, the durability of the coupling between agent and scaffold, the amount of trust
a user puts into the information the scaffold provides, the degree of transparency-in-use,
the ease with which the information can be interpreted, the amount of personalization,
and the amount of cognitive transformation. The way we interact with external
information may vary along all these dimensions and the higher a situated system
ranks on these dimensions, the denser the integration between agent and scaffold.
Generally, if the integration is dense, the artifact can be seen as part of an extended
cognitive system, whereas if it is shallow, the artifact can be seen as part of an
embedded cognitive system. So there is an ontological difference between embedded
and extended cognitive systems regarding the location of the physical substrate that
realizes cognition. Extended and distributed views claim that scaffolding is, under
certain conditions, constitutive of a cognitive state or process. Embedded views, in
contrast, argue that artifacts and other environmental scaffolding have important roles
in human cognitive functioning but are never part of cognition (e.g., Rupert 2004). I
will come back to this distinction below in section 4.2, where I theorize about the moral
status of cognitive artifacts in relation to their degree of integration.
This concise outline of situated cognition theory has shown that artifacts (and other
people) have important cognition-enhancing functions. It has also shown that moral
dimensions of such artifacts are not a prominent topic. To conceptualize situated
3 This paper is not the place for an argument about the conditions of cognitive extension, but for discussion see
(Sutton 2006; Menary 2010b; Sterelny 2010).
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cognitive system, theorists in this field typically focus on metaphysical, epistemolog-
ical, and methodological notions, but rarely on moral ones.
4 Moral aspects of cognitive artifacts
Having briefly outlined the cognitive enhancement debate and situated cognition
theory, I now aim to bring these debates together by presenting a general outline of
moral issues related to cognitive artifacts. Some of the same moral values outlined
above in section 2.2 such as authenticity, equal access, and fairness may be at stake
when using cognitive artifacts. For instance, like taking Ritalin during an exam, using a
smartphone with Internet access during an exam is seen as cheating and the results
obtained as inauthentic (compare Wheeler 2011). Depending on various social-
economic and cultural factors, we do not all have equal access to information, resulting
in information haves and have-nots. So, like with most technologies, there is not an
equal or fair distribution of cognitive technologies (see also Norman 1993, p. 202).
Some traditional moral issues in the cognitive enhancement debate thus also apply to
cognitive artifacts, which are important topics in need of further development. In this
section, however, I focus on the consequences of cognitive artifacts for brains, cogni-
tion, and culture; the moral status of cognitive artifacts; and their relation to personal
identity. These topics are central and distinctive to cognitive artifacts and have not
received much attention. The goal of this section is not so much to argue in favor of a
particular moral position, but to start addressing moral issues pertaining to cognitive
artifacts.
4.1 Consequences for brains, cognition, and culture
In order to start an analysis of the consequences of cognitive artifacts, consider the
following quote of Clark:
“It is our basic, biologically grounded nature (or so I have suggested) to be open
to a wide variety of forms of technologically mediated enhancements (…) not all
change is for the better, and hybridization (however naturally it may come to us)
is neutral rather than an intrinsic good. Uncritical talk of human “enhancement”
thus threatens to beg philosophically, culturally, and politically, important ques-
tions” (2007, p. 278, italics added).
Clark here suggests that it is in our biological nature to be open to enhance ourselves
with technology. He claims that hybridization (i.e., our tendency to integrate tools and
artifacts into our bodily, perceptual and cognitive systems) is not intrinsically good but
neutral. He further claims that conceptualizing all enhancement as positive threatens to
beg the question. We need not assume that all forms of hybridization are enhancements.
This statement connects to the theme of this special issue. One of the potential topics of
this special issue is not to use the term “enhancement” but “anthropotechnology”,
because enhancement is a value-laden term with a positive connotation, whereas
anthropotechnology is descriptive (see also Meacham 2015). Clark is clearly aware
of this issue, but he suggests that human-technology hybridization is neutral, echoing
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an instrumentalist view of technology. Let me explain why we should be careful with
the term “neutral” in relation to technology-use or hybridization.
4.1.1 Technological instrumentalism
Technological instrumentalism is a view claiming that artifacts are mere value-neutral
means to human ends (e.g., Pitt 2014). Technological artifacts merely connect a pre-
given intention with a desired effect without shaping or influencing either. An often
heard phrase in relation to instrumentalism is: “technology is not good or bad in itself, it
is how you use it that determines its value”. So, on this view, only the
intentions of the user determine the value of technology. Very few philosophers
of technology defend instrumentalism, because technologies do shape intentions
and effects. They are furthermore not mere value-neutral instruments, but some
artifacts are value-laden, which means they have moral values embedded in their
structure. Also, whilst instrumentalism does not explicitly deny that artifacts can
have unintended moral and societal consequences, it does not conceptualize these
consequences sufficiently.
There are at least three ways to understand the non-neutrality of technology. Some
argue that technological artifacts embody moral or political values. Bruno Latour
(1994) argues that speed bumps force drivers to slow down, in that way embodying
the value of traffic safety. Others, such as phenomenologist Don Ihde, argue that
“technologies transform experience, however subtle, and that is one root of their non-
neutrality” (1990, p. 49). Cars, telescopes, microscopes, walking canes, and hammers,
for example, mediate and transform our experiences and perceptions of the world. Yet
others argue that technology is not a mere means to an end, because artifacts have
unintended consequences which are beyond our control. These scholars acknowledge
that artifacts are used to achieve an end, but by doing so they also do unintended things.
Cars are used for transportation, but they also emit carbon dioxide and contribute to
global warming: an effect intended neither by the designers nor the users.
An instrumentalist view on cognitive artifacts would see them as mere neutral
instruments used for completing our cognitive tasks. For instance, I may have an
intention to drive from Sydney to Melbourne, but do not know how to get there, in
which case I typically use my navigation system. However, navigation systems do
much more than merely aiding us in navigating. My own navigation system beeps
when I drive too fast. Whilst I can try to ignore the beeping, its function is nonetheless
to make me aware that I am speeding and should slow down, in that way (like speed
bumps) embodying traffic safety.
Navigation systems transform our experiences and perceptions of the world. They
show points of interest like gas stations, car parks, and landmarks that are outside the
scope of our direct perception, in this way allowing us to “see” things we could
otherwise not have seen. Thus, phenomenologically, they transform our sense of
the environment.
Navigation systems have unintended consequences: their users run the risk of
becoming less skillful in navigating when they do not have access to their device. By
relying too often and too much on such systems, their users do not (learn to) memorize
routes, or to develop navigation skills by relying on orientation points. What they have
learned is to incorporate the functionality of such devices into their navigational
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practices, which, in some cases at least, has a negative impact on the accuracy and level
of detail of their internal cognitive maps (e.g., Burnett and Lee 2005).
So, whilst navigation systems are indeed instruments for realizing one’s intentions
and goals, they also embody moral values like safety, transform the experience of our
environment, and have unintended consequences on our onboard cognitive capabilities.
For these reasons, navigation systems and other cognitive artifacts are not mere neutral
instruments, but morally significant objects.
4.1.2 Cognitive transformation
Now, Clark is no instrumentalist and is well-aware that cognitive technologies are not
mere neutral instruments, but morally significant objects. Clark (2003, Ch. 7) points out
a number of moral and societal issues related to cognitive technology such as unequal
distribution of and access to cognitive technology; unauthorized access to personal
information by individuals, corporations, and governments; information overload; and
alienation. His attempt to address moral and societal issues is admirable, but one thing
he does not address is how such technologies might transform our brains and cognition
in certain ways. During our lifetime, we interact with cognitive artifacts from a very
young age. Abacuses, textbooks, blackboards, tablets, and other computer devices
populate classrooms and shape our brains and cognition in powerful ways. They do
so most clearly in childhood and adolescence, but continue to do so throughout our
lives. Through interacting with such artifacts, we internalize external representational
systems such as language, number systems, and diagrams, thereby learning to think in
terms of those systems (Menary 2010b). This hardly seems problematic from a moral
perspective as the cognitive capabilities that result from these transformations largely
define our human identity and have caused substantial progress for humans and
society at large.
However, some theorists have argued that an overreliance on external information
may cause a diminishing of some of our onboard cognitive capabilities and transform
our brain and cognition in perhaps undesirable ways. Consistently outsourcing
information-storage and processing functions to artifacts that are to varying degrees
integrated into larger cognitive systems may result in a diminishing of the outsourced
function or capacity, as the above example of navigation systems demonstrated. Nicolas
Carr (2011) therefore claimed that technology does not make us smart, but makes us
stupid. Critics, like Carr, fear that if artifacts do all the cognitive work for us, we will
never learn to do it ourselves, or when we have learned to do it ourselves, we might lose
that capacity due to a lack of practice. For example, navigation systems decrease the
level of detail in our internal cognitive maps, thereby diminishing our capacity to
navigate without such devices; constantly using calculators may result in lesser devel-
oped calculation skills; and reliable Internet access reduces our internal knowledge
base, because when we know information is easily available externally we tend to put
less effort into memorizing it.
But in a world where many people have wearable computing devices, one might ask
how bad this really is. Of course, there will be moments when we will be decoupled
from our devices and then experience that we are less good in remembering facts
without access to Google and Wikipedia, performing calculations without a calculator,
navigating without Google Maps, and planning without our online diary. However,
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proponents may argue that these are minor drawbacks in relation to what we gain from
cognitive technologies. One possible way to look at this situation is by taking a
consequentialist view and compare the advantages with the disadvantages. If the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages, then the changes to our onboard cognitive
capabilities are acceptable.
These worries echo Socrates’ critique of written language outlined in Plato’s Phae-
drus. Socrates argues that written language would erode biological memory as it allows
us to store information in the environment, rather than in the brain, in that way making
us cognitively lazy. Although Socrates may have a point,4 very few people today would
think that the development of written language is morally or culturally undesirable,
because it has brought us such enormous progress. With written language we may have
given up our ability to remember long narratives and our narrative culture (see
Rowlands 1999, p 135), but much progress in science, engineering, law, education,
and literature would have been impossible without it. If (wearable) computing tech-
nologies have similar cognitive and cultural effects, then we might say the advantages
outweigh the disadvantages.
An obvious problem with this kind of consequentialist reasoning is that it is difficult
to predict what cognitive and cultural consequences (wearable) computing technology
will ultimately have. For this reason, much more conceptual and empirical research is
needed on this topic (see also Barr et al. 2015). But one likely consequence is that
information and computing will become more ubiquitous. I think it is safe to say that
the computerization of our lifeworld will continue in the future. When that happens, the
cognitive functions of computational artifacts will be integrated deeper into a broader
spectrum of our cognitive abilities. Personalized smart devices and smart environments
will then complement and transform our onboard cognitive system in more ways,
which is already happening with our use of smartphones and tablets. In light of these
developments, future conceptual and empirical research should focus on at least the
following two questions: (1) what cognitive skills do we want to have in an information
society; and (2) how to design these artifacts and systems such that they optimize well-
being (broadly construed) and reduce possible negative consequences on brain, cogni-
tion, and culture?
4.2 The moral status of cognitive artifacts
Neuroethicists have argued that interfering with people’s brains (either with
psychopharmaceuticals, transcranial magnetic stimulation, or deep brain stimulation)
might be problematic, as our identity and capabilities are largely determined by the
brain. Our brains realize our emotional and cognitive capabilities, which, according to
some, are seen as essential for our moral status.5 However, we have seen that situated
and extended approaches to cognition argue that it is not just our brains that matter for
our cognitive capacities. Artifacts and other structures are important, too. So how do
cognitive artifacts relate to the notion of moral status? An implication of the extended
4 Somewhat ironically, if Plato did not wrote down Socrates’ worries, we would most likely not know about it
today.
5 These are by no means the only properties relevant for our moral status. For an overview, see Jaworska and
Tannenbaum (2013).
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mind thesis is that “in some cases interfering with someone’s environment will have the
same moral significance as interfering with their person” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.
18). For instance, tampering with information in Otto’s notebook is the same as
tampering with information stored in his brain. Johnny Søraker therefore concludes
that “the case with Otto’s notebook suggests that information and information technol-
ogy can have moral status, but only if they are constitutive and irreplaceable in a strong
sense” (2007, p. 14). Thus because external information, in some cases, has the same
cognitive status as information stored in the brain, it has moral status.
Neil Levy makes a somewhat similar point, but extrapolates further by arguing that:
“Neuroethics focuses ethical thought on the physical substrate subserving cogni-
tion, but if we accept that this substrate includes not only brains, but also material
culture, and even social structures, we see that neuroethical concern should
extend far more widely than has previously been recognized” (2007a, p. 10).
By including material culture into the domain of neuroethics and the cognitive
enhancement debate, the scope and ambition of the debate are significantly expanded.
I think both Søraker and Levy’s suggestions are excellent, but neither conceptualize the
further implications of their claims. What does it mean to say that some cognitive
artifacts have moral status? One thing it means is that, in addition to traditional legal
and moral issues of artifact-ownership, we ought not to interfere with people’s distrib-
uted minds. This seems particularly the case when people use artifacts to treat their
cognitive impairment or decline. Alzheimer’s patients, for instance, structure their
home-environment such that it compensates their cognitive decline (Dahlback et al.
2013; Drayson and Clark forthcoming). Such patients often have photos of family and
friends with indications of their relation to the patient (e.g., daughter), labels on objects
and doors, use memory books similar to Otto’s notebook, and keep important objects
(e.g., checkbooks) always in plain view, not locked away in drawers. Take these
people out of (or change) their personalized, self-structured environments and
one literally reduces their memory capabilities, which is highly undesirable not
just from a healthcare perspective, but also from a moral perspective (see also
Drayson and Clark forthcoming).
Generally, the more people depend on external information for their day-to-day
cognitive functioning, the deeper it is integrated with their onboard cognitive system.
These two aspects, degree of dependency and integration, are proportional to the
artifact’s moral status. Thus the moral status of cognitive artifacts is, I suggest, a
matter of degree and so there is no clear threshold for the moral status of cognitive
artifacts. Even artifacts that are shallowly integrated and merely scaffold our
thinking are important for the kind of cognitive abilities we have. Levy (2007b,
2011) therefore argues that embedded views equally imply that scaffolding de-
serves more attention from neuroethicists. He argues that it does not matter
whether we call situated cognitive systems embedded/scaffolded or extended/
distributed, what matters is the effect the artifact has on our cognitive capabilities.
I agree with Levy, but the effects they have are typically stronger when the
dependency is greater and the integration denser. So, I think, it does matter
whether cognition is merely embedded or genuinely distributed for the moral
status of cognitive artifacts.
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Finally, cognitive scientist Merlin Donald points out that computers “represent a
potentially irreversible shift in the cognitive balance of power towards complete
external symbol system-based dominance of human cognitive structure” (1991, pp.
355). There indeed seems to be a shift away from storing information internally and
towards storing information external to the brain (Sparrow et al. 2011). This means that,
in general, if we become more dependent on artifacts for performing our cognitive
tasks, their moral status increases. In section 4.1, I outlined that an unintended
consequence of artifact-use might be diminished onboard cognitive capabilities in some
domains, which, in turn, results in a higher dependency on artifacts. If this trend
continues, which Donald (1991) and Sparrow et al. (2011) seem to suggest, we may
infer that in the future, artifacts will become more important for our day-to-day
cognitive functioning and thus obtain a higher moral status.
4.3 Personal identity
Offloading information-storage functions to external media is a typical human feature
that shapes not only our cognitive system but also our personal identity in profound
ways. Clark and Chalmers recognized that “the information in Otto’s notebook, for
example, is a central part of his identity as a cognitive agent” (1998, p. 18). Personal
identity is a complex concept and I cannot do it justice in this short section. But
whatever psychological view one takes on personal identity, it is clear that memory
plays a central role. Memory is important to both the diachronic and synchronic
problem in the debate on personal identity. The diachronic problem concerns the
psychological continuity of one’s personal identity over time, whereas the synchronic
problem concerns the psychological features that characterize a person at one time.
In relation to the diachronic problem, some theorists focus on narrative memory,
arguing that who we are, i.e., our personal identities, can be seen as the narrative
construction of our past personal experiences, our autobiographical memories. On this
neo-Lockean view, our narrative is seen as constitutive of our personal identity. Given
this focus on memory, there is an obvious link to extended mind theory, which has
widely conceptualized extended memory (Wilson and Lenart 2014). Autobiographical
memories are not always located in the brain, but sometimes materialized into artifacts
such as photos, videos, and other significant objects like books, furniture, souvenirs, or
artworks (Van den Hoven 2014). An interesting example here is SenseCam, a small
wearable camera typically worn around one’s neck that automatically takes a picture
with a certain frequency, creating a visual narrative of one’s day-to-day life. SenseCams
are used by “normal” people and by those with cognitive impairments. Some patients
with amnesia or Alzheimer’s disease use SenseCam as a substitute for their biological
memory. For such patients, the visual narrative created by the device is literally part of
their life-narrative and thus constitutive of their personal identity.6
However, it is not just autobiographical memories that are important for personal
identity. One’s memory capabilities in the here-and-now are also relevant. Therefore, in
relation to the synchronic problem, we should take into account the memory aids that
are not directly related to autobiographical memory. The above example of Alzheimer’s
patients structuring their home-environment such that it compensates their cognitive
6 But see Lynne Rudder Baker (2009) for a critical discussion of extended personhood.
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decline is a case in point. Their use of photos, labels, memory books, and deliberately
placing objects at easily perceivable locations can be seen as cognitively “constitutive
and irreplaceable in a strong sense” (Søraker 2007, p. 14). Take these people out of (or
change) their self-structured environments and one reduces not just their memory but
also their personal identity. This does not only happen with patients, but also with
cognitively healthy people. Most people store a lot of information in their smartphones
or tablets (e.g., music, documents, pictures, videos, etc.) and use it for navigating,
planning their daily tasks, calculating, searching for information, and many other
things. These functions are not so much concerned with autobiographical memory,
but more with working memory in day-to-day tasks. Most people literally would not be
able to do some of these tasks without the aid of their personalized computing device.
So our abilities and personal identity are relational (Mackenzie and Walker 2015) and
are thus partly defined by the cognitive technologies we use.
5 Conclusion
Humans enhance their cognitive abilities not just with psychopharmaceuticals but also
with external artifacts. These have important moral aspects that have been neglected by
both the cognitive enhancement debate and situated cognition theory. This paper
developed a first attempt to fill this gap by conceptualizing and evaluating some of
the consequences of cognitive artifacts on brain, cognition, and culture; the moral status
of cognitive artifacts; and the effects they have on personal identity. These are just three
possible topics for moral reflection and further developing them and others would
strengthen the rather thin ties between and enrich both the cognitive enhancement
debate and situated cognition theory. The take home message is therefore twofold: (a)
neuroethics needs to pay more attention to cognitive artifacts, and (b) to fully concep-
tualize situated cognitive systems theorists in this field need to take into account their
moral aspects. Thus in future research, situated cognition theory may provide rich case
studies and the neuroethics of cognitive enhancement some of the conceptual tools to
analyze these case studies.
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